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Outline
• What is an intelligent software decoy
• Motivation for exploring the concept of a decoy
• Overview of related work
• Introduction to a software-decoy architecture
• Discussion of language and operating system
support for software decoys
• Current work, other research, and funding status
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Intelligent Software Decoy
• An abstraction for protecting objects from malicious
attacks by mobile agents
– We assume the attacker (i.e., rogue agent) will try to change the
behavior of the targeted object
• Intended to deceive an agent into believing it is the
object it advertises itself to be
• Provides a means for revealing the presence of an
attacker
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All Objects Can Serve as Decoys
• Decoy mode is triggered when the target object
receives a message that violates the object-agent
contract in one or more ways
• Decoy behavior is specified in an ante chamber
– When the precondition fails, the object’s interaction with the
agent is controlled internally via a constraint language
– The constraint language is an extension to the semantics of the
Eiffel programming language
Presentation at TOOLS 2001 Eiffel Summit
Santa Barbara, California, July 31, 2001 Bret Michael, Naval Postgraduate School Slide 5
Concept Based on the Unified Power of
Attack (UPA)
• One should try to neutralize one’s opponent by
means of, in the following order, reducing or
eliminating the opponent’s
– Will to attack
– Proximity of attack
– Ability to attack
• Our conceptualization of intelligent software decoys
is based on “software jiu jitsu”
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Properties of Intelligent Software Decoys
• Intelligent
– Adapt their behavior to changes in their operating environment
• Autarkic
– Do not rely on the internal state of other objects to protect
themselves
• Polymorphic (chameleon-like character)
– Disguise themselves by altering their object-interface contracts
at run-time
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Properties of Intelligent Software Decoys
• Policy-governed
– Behavior governed by pre- and postconditions, in addition to
class invariants
• Self-replicating
– Replicate themselves, either in an autonomous or cooperative
manner
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Motivation
• Software from which distributed systems are
composed needs to be protected from malicious
attack
– Recent “Code Red” worm
• Some of the features of distributed systems make
them tempting targets
– for instance, dynamic patching schemes
• Explore the use of Meyer’s design-by-contract model
to protect the components of distributed systems
Presentation at TOOLS 2001 Eiffel Summit
Santa Barbara, California, July 31, 2001 Bret Michael, Naval Postgraduate School Slide 10
Related Work
• Concept of software-based deception is not new
– Misrepresentation of an agent’s true goal, for purposes of
negotiating with other software agents
– Reasoning with incomplete information
– Byzantine Generals problem
– Reasoning about the intelligent behavior of software-based
systems
– Turing’s “imitation game” (a.k.a., Turing test)
– Self-deceiving software-based systems
– Software-based tools for constructing and maintaining
deceptions in virtual worlds
– for instance, Cohen’s Deception Toolkit (DTK)
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Related Work
• Information-theoretic techniques for detecting
evidence of deception
– for example, authentication-coding schemes
• Use of the “art of illusion” in the design of human-
computer interfaces
– Managing the virtual reality that the user of the interface
perceives
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Novel Aspects of Our Software Decoys
• Software contracts are used to
– Specify security policy, and mediate the interaction under policy
between the intelligent software decoy and the attacker
• Postconditions and invariants place fail-safe
constraints on the behavior of the decoy
– Contain and observe the attacker, while attempting to prevent
the attacker from learning that the attack has been detected
• Class invariant makes it impossible for the agent to
change the decoy’s behavior via the interface
• Decoy can change its appearance via polymorphism
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Intelligent Software-Decoy Architecture
• Software decoys are objects within components
• Connectors between components are named
interfaces
– Name advertised to other components need not be unique
– Consist of an ordered list of arguments
– Primitive types or object classes (supporting polymorphic types)
• Each class is composed of its own arguments and
behavior
– Arguments are used to access methods of objects within a
component
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Intelligent Software-Decoy Architecture
• Modification of the software decoy’s interface is
supported by polymorphism
– Change one or more of the
– Arguments
– Order of the arguments
– Data type or class of arguments
– Number and position of dummy arguments
• Component interaction is based on a contract that is
controlled by assertions as well as a polymorphic
type
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Intelligent Software-Decoy Architecture
• An agent cannot modify the behavior of the decoy
beyond the extent to which such modification is
permitted by the parent class of the decoy
• Venus flytrap model
– If the precondition fails, then the decoy does not thwart the
attack, but rather contains the attacker
– Invariant and postconditions defend the object
– The decoy deceives the attacker into thinking its attack has not
been detected, maintaining the interest of the attacker
– Observe and try to determine intent and source of attack
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Language and Operating System
Support for Software Decoys
• Eiffel is a natural choice because it provides explicit
support for
– Design-by-contract
– Inheritance of the assertions from ancestor classes by a
descendant class
– Needed to preserve the integrity of the software contracts
• Sombrero or StratOSphere distributed operating
system are also a natural choices
– Single address space operating systems support the naming
conventions needed for implementing intelligent software
decoys
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Practical for Use with Legacy Systems?
• Yes
– One can wrap existing software objects with contracts,
especially objects that are critical for the correct behavior and
availability of mission-critical systems or the underlying
information infrastructure
• Eventually, one would want to rewrite the software
objects, such as the implementation of the File
Transfer Protocol
– This is costly, but one can gradually introduce contracts
through the use of contract-wrappers
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Practical from a False-Positive View?
• Need to minimize the probability that a decoy will
turn a false positive into a situation in which the
object denies service to a legitimate user (or agent)
– For example, a buffer overflow can be due to either
– An egregious use of the interface (i.e., non-attack scenario)
– An attack
– In signature-based systems, the signatures tend to be general,
and there are issues of temporal validity of the signatures
• Decoy provides the object time to assess the nature
of interaction and signature
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Potential Weakness and Solution
• Relies on a strong foundation:  the distributed
operating system (e.g., 2K or Legion) along with the
local network operating system (e.g., Windows NT)
– If the operating system is not trusted, then the attacker will
circumvent the contract interface of the object, preferring to
instead attack the weak infrastructure
• Proposed solution
– Incorporate the intelligent software decoys into the design of
the operating system itself
– Most modern operating systems are full of security holes that
could be partially addressed with the use of software contracts
Presentation at TOOLS 2001 Eiffel Summit
Santa Barbara, California, July 31, 2001 Bret Michael, Naval Postgraduate School Slide 20
Significantly Different from Other
Approaches?
• Yes
– Represents a major shift in security paradigm
– Integration of formal methods (design-by-contract), deception
techniques, and Unified Power of Attack, and actual application of
software engineering principles
• Complementary to some other approaches
– For example, it could be used in conjunction with the Return
Address Defender (Chiueh and Hsu, State University of New
York at Stony Brook)
– Addresses the primary weakness of RAD:  RAD itself is
susceptible to attack via a buffer overflow
– RAD could be wrapped with the decoy software (i.e., a contract)
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Current  and Proposed Work
• Developing a formal model of the intelligent software
decoy architecture
• Exploring the use of various types of decoys
– For instance, “volunteer” and “drafted” decoys
• Intend to investigating the technical feasibility of
realizing the intelligent software decoy architecture
by using the “Code Red” worm
– The worm exploits the IIS Indexing Service DLL via a buffer-
overflow technique
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Status of Publications and Presentations
• Published an article on the concept in the
Proceeding of the Workshop on Engineering
Automation for Software Intensive System
Integration (Monterey, Calif., June 2001).
• Several presentations at universities and research
institutes within the United States
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